한발씩
구독자 2명구독중 6명
개인이 소액으로 시작해서 자금 늘릴 수 있는 스윙을 지향합니다
가치(Value)와 가격(Price)의 구분
가치 = 자산의 기초 펀더멘털(earning power) 에서 도출되는 내재가치.
가격 = 시장 참여자들의 심리와 투표(매수/매도)로 결정되는 현재 거래 가격.
투자 성공은 가치를 정확히 평가하고 가격이 가치보다 낮을 때 매수하는 데 달려 있음.
투자 성과의 원천
장기 성과: 기업의 지속적 earning power 여부가 핵심.
단기 성과: 투자자 심리에 따라 변동하는 가격 움직임이 지배적.
따라서 단기 시장은 투표기계(심리), 장기 시장은 저울기계(가치)로 작동.
시장 심리와 왜곡
낙관(FOMO, risk tolerance) ↔ 비관(공포, 회피)의 균형이 무너지면 가격이 가치에서 과도하게 괴리.
괴리는 결국 수렴하지만, “시장은 당신이 지급 능력을 잃기 전보다 더 오래 비이성적일 수 있다” (Keynes).
현재(2025년 8월) 시장 상황
S&P500은 2024년 말부터 높은 밸류에이션 상태 유지.
관세 충격(2025년 4월) 후 급락 → 이후 29% 반등, 연초 대비 +9%.
PE, P/S, 버핏지수, 크레딧 스프레드 등 대부분의 지표가 역사적으로 높은 수준.
특히 “Magnificent 7”을 제외한 나머지 493개 기업조차 평균 22배 PER → 시장 전반의 고평가 신호.
투자자 행동 요인
16년 이상 큰 약세장을 경험하지 않은 세대 → 리스크 감수 심리 강화.
“TACO (Trump Always Chickens Out)” 같은 합리화 → 부정적 뉴스 무시.
AI에 대한 기대, 미국 시장의 무(無)대안 인식 → 추가 낙관 심리 강화.
Bull Case vs Bear Case
Bull Case: 오늘날 기업들은 과거 대비 성장성·비경기성·높은 마진·강력한 경쟁우위 → 높은 PER 정당화 가능.
Bear Case: 대부분 기업에 대해 과잉 낙관 적용, fundamentals는 악화된 반면 가격은 더 높아짐 → “elevated → worrisome” 구간 진입.
투자 행동 지침
Howard Marks는 “InvestCon” 스펙트럼 제시:
6️⃣ 매수 중단
5️⃣ 공격적 자산 비중 축소, 방어적 자산 비중 확대 ← 현재 적합
4️⃣ 공격적 자산 청산
3️⃣ 방어적 자산도 축소
2️⃣ 전량 매도
1️⃣ 숏 포지션
현실적으로 3~1단계까지 가는 것은 위험하며, 지금은 InvestCon 5 국면이라고 판단.
가치 vs 가격의 구분을 명확히 이해하고, 단기 변동(심리)에 흔들리지 말 것.
현재 시장은 역사적으로 높은 밸류에이션, fundamentals보다 심리에 의해 지탱되는 측면이 크다.
AI·무대안 논리·TACO 등 낙관론이 강하게 작동하지만, 이는 과거 버블 시기의 합리화 패턴과 유사하다.
단기 조정 가능성은 불확실, 그러나 장기적으로는 고평가가 낮은 수익률로 이어질 가능성 높음.
전략: 지금은 공격적 매수 자제, 방어적 포트폴리오 강화 (InvestCon 5) 국면.
신중한 투자자는 현금흐름과 earning power 기반의 내재가치에 집중해야 하며, 심리적 과열 지표들을 주시해야 함.
전문:
[Music] This is the memo by Howard Marx. The calculus of value. [Music] On July 28th, I flew to South America on a plane without Wi-Fi, leaving me without email or entertainment. What was I to do but start in on a memo? Interestingly, the things I wrote during that flight turned out to be the answers to many of the questions I received from clients after I landed. So, writing what follows served me well. I hope it'll do the same for you. January 2nd of this year was the 25th anniversary of my memo bubble.com, the one that put my writing on the map. And I marked the occasion by publishing another memo called On Bubble Watch. While the title may have raised concern for readers, my main conclusion was that the elevated US stock market valuations at the time didn't necessarily signal the existence of a bubble. Mainly because I didn't detect the extreme investor psychology I associate with bubbles. Security prices were lofty but not nutty is how I put it. Because a lot has taken place in the seven months since then, it's time for an update on asset values. Before I start, please note that I'm talking about investing in general. My specific reference will be to public US corporate securities, stocks and bonds, since they market to market regularly and are the assets that most enter my consciousness. But since investors actions toward one group of assets and the resulting price movements influence other assets and other markets and since they ensue largely from investor psychology which is highly contagious, I think my comments are probably applicable to other asset classes to private assets as well as public ones and possibly to markets outside the US. I'll start by laying out where I think investment value comes from and how it should be assessed. I don't think I've ever done this before in this form. It's a big topic, but I'll try to cover it briefly. Value. Investment assets, things such as stocks, bonds, companies, and buildings have a value, which is sometimes referred to as their intrinsic value, what the asset is worth at a point in time. This value is subjective. It can't definitively be found anywhere, not even by AI, as far as I know, and opinions will differ as to what it is. In my parlance, the value of an asset is derived from its fundamentals. The fundamentals of a company, for example, encompass a great many things. These include its current earnings, its earning power in the future, the steadiness or variability of its future earnings, the market value of its component assets, the skill of management, its potential to develop new products, the competitive landscape, the strength of its balance sheet, and the myriad additional factors that will influence the company's future. Ultimately, the totality of an asset's fundamentals constitute its earning power, which in turn is the source of its value. A company may own land, buildings, machinery, vehicles, and natural resources such as mineral deposits or forests, and even facilities that allow it to derive electricity from river water or sunshine, which it obviously doesn't own. These are tangible assets and there's often a market for them and a realizable price. But a company may also have assets that are intangible such as patents, trade secrets, knowhow, research capability, reputation and image, human talent, management skill and culture. Some of these may be transferable and salailable but others are not. All the assets just mentioned have earning power individually and in combination they create a company's overall earning power. A company's earning power almost always exceeds the sum of the earning power of each of its individual assets taken in isolation. Combining individual assets to maximize a company's overall earning power is the top job of management. When successful, the result is synergy. the benefit gained from skillfully combining things. But not all assets have earning power as I define it. And thus, not all have calculable investment value. I describe earning power as the money you can make by owning and operating an asset. That is, I omit from earnings the possible gains from simply holding an asset and ultimately selling it. A diamond ring, painting, or classic car doesn't produce earnings for its owner short of renting it out or charging people to look at it. For this reason, its economic potential comes exclusively from the possibility of selling it at a profit. And the person who buys it is likely to be doing so in the hope of selling it to someone else at a still higher price despite the fact that it won't produce earnings in the interim. I think of assets that don't produce operating cash flow or have the potential to do so in the future as not having earning power and that makes them impossible to value objectively, analytically or intrinsically. See my 2010 memo about gold, all that glitters. Some earning power is current and produces income today. The result can be seen in this year's financial statements. the income that today's assets are producing in their current configuration and under today's conditions. Other earning power exists in the form of potential. For example, the income that will be earned when today's holdings of natural resources are exploited in the future or the income that will be generated from new products developed by the company's employees from its intellectual property. The result will be dependent on the environment that unfolds which in turn will be influenced by decisions made by company management, competitors, customers, governments and even investors. Assets can be tangible or intangible. And an asset's earning power can produce earnings today and also in the future in amounts that might be higher or lower than today. Together, an asset's current earnings, plus its power to produce earnings in the future, constitute its key fundamentals. Some investors emphasize paying a reasonable price for today's earning power, and others are willing to bet on what they see as potential growth in earning power. Regardless, I think prudent investing has to be based on judgments regarding an asset's present and future earning power. Once an investor has determined an asset's intrinsic value in this way, he will have a basis for establishing a right price that will allow for good returns in the future. Price. [Music] While value can seem theoretical and ephemeral, price is concrete. It's the amount you pay to obtain something. Ultimately, as just mentioned, doing a good job of investing comes down to estimating value appropriately and purchasing that value at a reasonable price. As previously mentioned, there are a great many things that combine to make up an asset's fundamentals. Ultimately, they can be boiled down to its earning power. And it's from earnings that value is derived. In the late 1960s, I was taught at the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business that the right price for an asset is the discounted present value of its future cash flows or earnings. You might object, what about all the other things listed above, such as a company's plant and equipment, intellectual property and management, and even its reputation? Don't they have value? The value of all of these things is derived from their ability to contribute to the company's earning power and thus it's captured in the earnings calculation. The key part of a security analyst's job consists of arriving at earnings projections. Then those projections have to be converted into a fair price. At the University of Chicago, the discounting process was purely mathematical. You divide the earnings for each year in the future by 1 + r to the nth power where r is the appropriate discount rate and n is the number of years out into the future the earnings are. And then you total up the yearly results. But in the real world, price is set by a different discounting process which consists mostly of people applying their subjective opinions and attitudes about what the asset and its earning power are worth. So that's what an asset's price is. The consensus view of investors regarding its underlying fundamental value. According to Benjamin Graham, the father of value investing and Warren Buffett's teacher at Colombia, market prices are set each day by investors who cast their votes by offering to buy or sell. Some investors think a company has a solid product line and competent management and others consider it stodgy and outmoded. Some investors find another company sexy and right for the future and others think it's a risky high-f flyier. These attitudes are converted into asset prices. This is where the tugofwar comes in. As I see it every day with regard to every asset, the optimists do battle with the pessimists. The market throws out GM at $52. The optimists think it's worth $58, so they're happy to buy at $52. Since the pessimists think it's only worth $46, they're willing to accommodate the buyers by selling at $52 and a trade takes place. But sometimes one side or the other predominates. If the people who think it's worth $58 outnumber the ones who think it's worth $46, more people will want to buy at $52 than want to sell there. So, the price will rise to $53 and maybe $54 and so forth. Just as an imbalance of opinion in one direction or the other can move the price of GM, it can also move a whole market. Sometimes the overall mood of investors in a market is positive, meaning they're characterized by optimism, credulousness, fear of missing out, FOMO, and risk tolerance. And sometimes the mood is negative and marked by pessimism, skepticism, fear of loss, and excessive risk aversion. Whereas in ...